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Recent Decisions
FEDERAL COURTS: JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS -
A QUESTION OF FEDERAL OR STATE LAW
Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
A resident of Maryland brought a diversity action for libel in the
Federal District Court of Vermont against a New York corporation.' The
district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that no right to
relief had been shown.2 On appeal, the Second Circuit sitting en banc,
vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for considera-
tion of the issue of jurisdiction over the defendant corporation. Held:
(1) state law determines whether the federal court may assume personal
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in a diversity action;' and (2) fed-
eral law is invoked only to determine the constitutionality of the state's
assertion of jurisdiction.
The majority opinion expressly overrules the alternative holding of
a previous Second Circuit decision, Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc.4
Judge Clark, who had written the majority decision in Jaftex strongly
dissented, contending that federal law alone governs this jurisdictional
question.
Diversity jurisdiction affords an out-of-state litigant a neutral forum.'
But this jurisdiction is sharply limited by the application of state law and
state policy as demanded by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.' Oftentimes state
policy conflicts with the procedure and independent administration of
the federal courts.! Specifically, a conflict exists when a state has not
gone as far as the Constitution permits in holding a foreign corporation
amenable to suit.' Under these circumstances a federal court in a diver-
1. The action was brought in Vermont apparently to take advantage of that state's three
year statute of limitations for libel actions. According to the majority opinion only three
other states, Arkansas, New Mexico, and Hawaii, have such lengthy periods of limitation.
Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 221 & n. 2 (2d Cir. 1963).
2. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 205 F. Supp. 56 (D. Vt. 1962).
3. Since the instant case did not require the court to pass on the issue of the applicable "do-
ing business" standard, the elaborate opinion may be characterized as dictum. But dictum or
not, no one can now doubt the Second Circuit's position on this issue.
4. 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
5. Diversity jurisdiction has withstood many attacks over its 175 year history. See generally
1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 5 0.60 (8.-4] (2d ed. 1961).
6. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7. See Ragan v. Merchant Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) wherein a state
provision concerning commencement of actions was held controlling over the Federal Rules.
See also Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) wherein it was held
that a local statute which under certain circumstances requires a plaintiff to give security for
the payment of reasonable expenses cannot be disregarded by federal courts in diversity actions.
8. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, on remand, 158 Ohio St. 145, 107
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sity action is faced with the crucial question: shall it apply the state "do-
ing business" test or the federal standard?9 Application of the broader
federal standard may allow the plaintiff a suit in a federal court which is
denied him by the state court. On the other hand, application of the
narrower state standard by the federal court results in the surrender of
that court's right to determine the parties over whom it will adjudicate.
It is a dose question. The courts and commentators are divided."0
The approach to this problem has not been universal. Moreover,
different approaches have been employed in reaching the same conclu-
sion. As a result, classification of the various federal courts according
to their application of a federal or state test is of little benefit in evalu-
ating the principal issue." Some courts appear oblivious to any Erie
N.E.2d 203 (1952); Wescott-Alexander, Inc. v. Dailey, 264 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1959); Elliott
v. United States Steel Export Co., 186 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
9. The "federal standard" for determining personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
escapes exact definition. Courts generally rely on notions of fairness and reasonableness in
the application of tests which vary with the individual case. Moreover, the extent of the
federal standard is unclear. Many federal courts apply identical standards in defining both
the due process limits of state jurisdiction and the extent of federal jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Sanders Associates, Inc. v. Gallon Iron Works & Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1962);
14 W. RES. L Rnv. 610 (1963).
Removal jurisdiction is not involved. All courts appear to agree that the state "doing
business" standard is applicable upon removal to the federal court. See, e.g., Rosenthal v.
Frankfort Distillers Corp., 193 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1951); Pucci v. Blatz Brewing Co., 127 F.
Supp. 747 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
10. Compare 1A MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrIcE 5 0.317(5), at 3535 (2d ed. 1951) (federal
standard applies), with 1 BAMRON & HOLIZOFF, FEDERAL PRACrrCE AND PROCEDURE 5
138 n.35.4, at 601 (Rules ed. 1960) (state standard applies).
11. According to the Arrowsmith majority opinion, there "exists an overwhelming consensus
that the amenability of a foreign corporation to suit in a federal court in a diversity action is
determined in accordance with the law of the state where the court sits ...." Arrowsmith
v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1963). Cases are cited from Circuits 1, 3,
4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 as applying a state standard. Judge Clark, in an appendix, attempts to
cut down this authority to the Third and Seventh Circuits. He contends that cases in which
service was made under rule 4(d) (7) of the Federal Rules are not in point. In these cases,
"state law must of course be looked to in determining whether a defendant served pursuant
to a state statute is properly before the court." Id. at 242.
The majority finds this position "quite unsound." Although a defendant is served pur-
suant to Rule 4 (d) (7), the initial issue before the court is one of jurisdiction over the person
and not manner of service.
The majority has the better reasoned view. Even though service is made on a state official
as required by state statute, the federal court must first consider whether the defendant cor-
poration is amenable to suit before it examines the validity of that service in other respects.
Prior to deciding the initial issue of jurisdiction, the court must determine which standard it
will apply - state or federal.
A careful reading of the cases cited by the majority, however, reveals that the foregoing
analysis is rarely followed. As pointed out by Judge Biggs, concurring in Partin v. Michaels
Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953), a leading case for the majority position, "it
is not apparent whether the decision (in Partin) is based on a construction of Fed. Rules
Civ. Proc., rule 4(d) (7) . .. or strictly on the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.!' Id. at
545.
In spite of the paucity of decisions which fully consider the problem and the resultant
confusion in this area, it generally is agreed that the greater weight of authority favors the
application of state law. For listings of cases under various classifications see Kenny v. Alaska
Airlines, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 838, 845-46 nn.7-9 (S.D. Cal. 1955); 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF,
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implications,' 2 others specifically find Erie inapplicable, 3 while still
others deem Erie not only in point, but controlling. 4
Several courts have ignored Erie by resting their application of a state
standard on rule 4(d) (7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 5
This rule provides that service of process is sufficient if made in the
manner prescribed by the forum state. 6 It has been interpreted as a
demand that state law determine the question of jurisdiction over foreign
corporations. This view has no basis. Rule 4(d) (7) merely provides
an alternate method for service and no jurisdictional meaning may be
attached.
7
Other courts ignoring Erie have applied the federal standard. These
courts simply fail to recognize the existence of a jurisdictional issue.i"
Authority for the applicable "doing business" test is grounded indiscrimi-
nately on both pre- and post- Erie decisions. The great majority of cases
applying the federal standard fall into this category.
In a second approach to this issue, courts have appreciated the im-
portance of the Erie decision, but regard its doctrine as inapplicable to the
question of personal jurisdiction. Shortly after Erie, an Ohio district
court reasoned that the issue of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is
simply a procedural matter.'9 Thus, the federal and not the Ohio "doing
business" test was applied.
A more compelling argument for the inapplicability of Erie takes
into account the outcome test29 defined in Guaranty-Trust Co. v. York. 2'
It is contended that the outcome test does not extend to the initial amen-
ability to suit, but is only applied after jurisdiction is established. Accord-
ing to this restricted view, the application of state law after disposal of
the jurisdictional issue necessarily results in uniformity of outcome.
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 5 179 nn. 95.3, 96, at 696-97 (Rules ed. 1960); Note,
Doing Business as a Test of Venue and Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations in the Federal
Courts, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 394, 398 n.27 (1956).
12. See, e.g., L.D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959).
13. See, e.g., Hedrick v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 28 F. Supp. 257 (S.D. Ohio 1939).
14. See, e.g., Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
15. Illiff v. American Fire Apparatus Co., 277 F.2d 360 (4th Cit. 1960); Florio v. Powder
Power Tool Corp., 248 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957).
16. Service "is also sufficient if the summons and complaint are served in the manner pre-
scribed . . . by the law of the state in which the district court is held ...." FED. R. CIV. P.
4(d) (7).
17. Rule 82 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically states that venue and jur-
isdiction are unaffected by the rules. Thus, any argument based on the wording of rule
4 (d) (7) alone is clearly erroneous.
18. See, e.g., Lasky v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 157 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1946); McWhorter v.
Anchor Serum Co., 72 F. Supp. 437 (W.D. Ark. 1947).
19. Hedrick v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 28 F. Supp. 257 (S.D. Ohio 1939).
20. In diversity cases, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially
the same as it would be if tried by a state court.
21. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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This view ignores the fact that the Supreme Court already has limited
the jurisdiction of the federal courts in diversity actions by demanding
enforcement of state door-closing statutes.2 As a result of these deci-
sions, a foreign corporation which is barred from the use of a state's
courts is not allowed recourse to the federal courts on the basis of diver-
sity. Thus, the Supreme Court has already extended the Erie--Guaranty
analysis to the initial amenability to suit. Therefore, application of the
outcome test to the principal issue demands there be no outcome in the
federal court since the state's refusal to take jurisdiction results in no out-
come in the state court. Only then does there exist true intra-state uni-
formity.2
3
A third approach to the instant question involves application of the
Erie--Guaranty analysis as modified in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Co-op., Inc. 4 This case suggests an interest-weighing test for determina-
tion of the applicable standard in the individual diversity case. The pol-
icy of providing the same outcome in the federal court as in the state
court must be balanced against federal policies demanding independent
administration of the federal courts. In Byrd, the overriding federal pol-
icy requiring jury trial was "under the influence - if not the command
- of the Seventh Amendment. ..."" In the instant case Judge Clark,
in dissent, finds an overriding federal policy within Article Ill of the Con-
stitution which demands that the federal courts hear diversity cases. "
Judge Clark cites Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach27 for a statement of what he
considered to be the correct rule: "In entertaining diversity cases ... [the
federal district court] is responding to a constitutional demand made ef-
fective by congressional action and... has a constitutional duty to hear
and adjudicate."2" In sum, the federal courts are an independent system
and therefore should remain sovereign on the issue of admittance to their
courts.
Furthermore, the Court in Byrd, prior to invoking the interest weigh-
ing test, interpreted the state rule as one not bound up with the state
created right. Arguing analogously it has been maintained that restric-
tive state service of process laws are not indicative of state policy, but are
22. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), wherein the door was closed to
plaintiffs who had not complied with the prerequisites demanded by a state statute for main-
tenance of suit, Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), wherein the door was closed
by a state statute to a mortgagee seeking a deficiency judgment.
23. See generally Note, 37 IND. L.J. 352, 354-55 (1962).
24. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
25. Id. at 537.
26. "The judicial Power shall extend to... Controversies ... between Citizens of different
States .. " U.S. CoNs'r. art III, S 2.
27. 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
28. Id. at 407.
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